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Noncooperative game-theoretic models of sequential bargaining give an 
underpinning to cooperative solution concepts derived from axioms, and 
have proved useful in applications (see Osborne and Rubinstein 1990). But 
experimental studies of sequential bargaining with discounting have gener-
ally found systematic deviations between the offers people make and per-
fect equilibrium offers derived from backward induction (e.g., Ochs and 
Roth 1989). 
We have extended this experimental literature in two ways. First, 
we used a novel software system to record the information subjects 
looked at while they bargained. Measuring patterns of information search 
helped us draw inferences about how people think, testing as directly 
as possible whether people use backward induction to compute offers. 
Second, we compared bargaining over gains that shrink over time (because 
of discounting) to equivalent bargaining over losses that expand over 
time. 
In the games we studied, two players bargain by making a finite number 
of alternating offers. A unique subgame-perfect eqUilibrium can be com-
puted by backward induction. The induction begins in the last period and 
works forward. Our experiments use a three-round game with a pie of 
$5.00 and a 50-percent discount factor (so the pie shrinks to $2.50 and 
$1.25 in the second and third rounds). In the perfect equilibrium the first 
player offers the second player $1.25 and keeps $3.75. 1 
In previous experiments (including ours; see Johnson et a!. 1991) sub-
jects actually offer the second player something between the $1.25 equilib-
rium and $2.50, an equal split of the initial pie. Mean offers are around 
$2.00. Lower offers, including equilibrium offers of $1.25, are often 
rejected. 
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In our expanding-loss experiments subjects began with $5 for each 
round. Then the players bargained over division of a loss of $5.00 in the 
first round, a loss of $7.50 in the second round, and a loss of $8.75 in the 
third round. If they reached no agreement, each lost their $5.00 and the 
game was over. By adding the $5 stakes to the potential losses at each 
stage, it is easy to see that the shrinking-gain and expanding-loss games are 
equivalent if players maximize net wealth. Using backward induction, we 
derive the same equilibrium as in the shrinking gain game: player 1 offers 
player 2 a loss of $3.75 (a net gain of $1.25 when the stake is added) and 
accepts a loss of $1.25. 
Comparing behavior in gain-and-Ioss games tests whether players bar-
gain over final wealth positions, or are instead sensitive to changes in 
wealth (as suggested by "framing effects" in studies of individual choices, 
e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979). If players "segregate" their $5 stake 
from the losses they bargain over, and react differently to losses than to 
gains, then behavior in the two games might be different, even though the 
games have the same implications for net wealth. 
Our work is part of a broader attempt to identify whether there are 
systematic deviations between actual behavior in games and behavior pre-
dicted by solution concepts. The hope is that the study of s~ch deviations 
might throw light on the basic reasoning processes players use. 2 The pre-
sumption is that bounded rationality might cause players to reason differ-
ently than theorists do. (Our experiments also shed light on how players 
learn, if they do not reason game-theoretically.) The two-person alternating-
offer bargaining we study is a fruitful setting for searching for deviations 
because the backward induction that underlies perfect eqUilibrium calcula-
tions is difficult. 
We suspect there are three classes of deviations from game-theoretic 
reasoning: (I) players do not look forward and backward sufficiently; (2) 
players do not reason sophisticatedly about the choices of others; and (3) 
players violate expected utility maximization (much as they do in making 
individual choices). Our experiments test for deviations of the first and 
third type. 
Explaining Observed Anomalies: Fairness vs. Learning 
Observed departures from eqUilibrium bargaining have two possible 
sources. Fairness theories account for the departures by assuming that play 
is in equilibrium, but players have a preference for fair rules or a utility for 
fairness (e.g., Bolton 1991). (Rejections of offers above $1.25 among player 
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2s suggests a disutility for unfairness, which might induce an apparent 
utility for fairness among player Is.) Learning theories account for the 
observed departures by suggesting that players do not initially understand 
how the structure of the game conveys bargaining power. Confused, or 
naive, players resort to conventions of fairness, but experience can teach 
them how the game's structure creates bargaining power; then they will 
offer equilibrium divisions (with no concern for fairness). 
There is evidence to support both views. In ultimatum games with one 
round, or dictator games in which player 1 dictates a division player 2 has 
to accept, players do not always offer small sums to others, as perfect 
equilibrium based on self-interest predicts; many offers are equal splits (e.g., 
Thaler 1988; Forsythe et al. 1988; but see Hoffman et a1. 1991). These data 
suggest fairness plays some role. 
Evidence consistent with the learning hypothesis comes from three ex-
periments on sequential bargaining in which convergence to equilibrium 
offers occurred with suitable experience. In Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton 
1985 experience taught player 2s to make equilibrium offers in a second 
bargaining trial, when they were placed in the role of player 1. In Harrison 
and McCabe 1992 offers converged to the perfect equilibrium in several 
repetitions of a three-stage game, when subjects also played the second-
stage subgame between each repetition of the three-stage game. In Neelin, 
Sonnenschein, and Spiegel 1988 economics students, who probably had 
some exposure to game theory, chose the perfect equilibrium immediately 
in a two-stage game. 
Our intention is not to resolve the debate over the two interpretations. 
Instead, we cast the learning hypothesis as an assertion that players do not 
reason game-theoretically at first, and we test that assertion directly. Our 
evidence does not resolve the debate because players who do not backward 
induct might be concerned about fairness, too. But if backward induction is 
a poor description of players' thinking, then any theory which claims the 
data are equilibrium offers, reflecting both fairness and a cognitive under-
standing based on backward induction, is falsified. 
Framing Effects in Sequential Bargaining 
An interesting question is whether subjects bargain in the same way over 
the division of shrinking gains and the division of expanding losses from a 
stake. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) accounts for differ-
ences between gains and losses which result in the same net wealth, by 
assuming that people value outcomes compared to a reference point. Then 
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outcomes can be expressed as positive or negative deviations, gains or 
losses, depending on the "frame" (or reference point) one adopts. Inducing 
gains and losses by allowing a reference point is different from the ortho-
dox approach, in which people have utility over net wealth, in two ways: 
(I) people are assumed to have diminishing sensitivity to increasing 
changes and (2) they are assumed to be more sensitive to losses than to 
gains (or "loss-averse"). Diminishing sensitivity implies a value function 
that is concave for gains (corresponding to diminishing marginal utility) 
and convex for losses (diminishing marginal dis utility), reflecting in shape 
at the origin. Reflection implies that people will take risks when the possi-
ble outcomes are all losses. 
Many applications of prospect theory have focused on the framing 
effects of gains and losses. For example, Bazerman (1983) compared the 
efficiency of bargains achieved by subjects when outcomes were formu-
lated as gains or as losses. His subjects were more likely to disagree when 
bargaining over losses, consistent with the principle that subjects are more 
risk-seeking in the domain of losses. Similarly, if our subjects are more 
risk-seeking in the domain of losses, we expect to see more rejected offers 
in the expanding-loss game. < 
Weg and Zwick (1991) studied sequential bargaining over gains and 
losses when a fixed cost is imposed each period (rather than a percentage 
cost, due to discounting, as in our setup). They found no difference in 
bargaining over gains and losses. Furthermore, their results, and experi-
ments by Rapoport, Weg, and Felsenthal (1990), suggest that behavior in 
fixed-cost games is much better predicted by perfect equilibrium than be-
havior in discounting games is. 
Methodology 
Subjects were Wharton undergraduates recruited from business or econom-
ics classes, or from general sign-up sheets posted around the campus. Ten 
students met in our lab at a certain time. The methods in the gain-and-loss 
sessions were the same, except subjects in loss sessions were given $60 at 
the start, from which losses were later subtracted. The $60 stake represents 
$5 in each of eight rounds, plus a $20 flat payment. We gave subjects the 
entire stake at the beginning of the experiment and encouraged them to 
put it in their pockets, so they would be more likely to mentally segregate 
the stake from subsequent losses. 
An experimenter read instructions aloud to make them common knowl-
edge. Afterwards, subjects worked through several examples (balanced to 
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avoid biasing their responses) and took a quiz to ensure they understood 
the instructions. 
Each group of ten subjects played eight three-round alternating-offer 
bargaining games, with a different anonymous opponent each time. This 
general design helps subjects to learn from "stationary replication" of the 
game, while avoiding the reputation effects that might arise if two subjects 
were playing each other repeatedly and knew it. 
At the end of the sessions, subjects were paid half of the dollar amounts 
they actually earned from bargaining, in cash. In the loss sessions, subjects 
physically paid us back some of their initial stake. 
Recording Information Search with MOUSELAB 
The novelty of our experiments in this study, and in Johnson et al. 1991, is 
that we recorded the information search of the players. 
Subjects were not told the pie sizes in each of the three stages. Instead, 
the pie sizes were hidden behind boxes on a computer screen, shown in 
figure 1. 1. The computer screen has six boxes. Behind each box is the 
amount of the pie in a round (left-hand column boxes) or the role of the 
subject in a round3 (right-hand column boxes), for each of the three rounds 
of the game. To see what is in a box, subjects use a mouse to move a cursor 
Figure 1.1 
The MOUSELAB display of the shrinking-pie game subjects saw 
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into the box. Once the cursor enters the box, the box automatically opens, 
revealing the pie size. In figure 1. I, for example, the player opens the first 
box and sees that the first-round pie is a loss of $4.00. 
The computer system we use, called MousELAB, records the location of 
the cursor every 60 milliseconds, giving a fine-grained measure of the time 
when each box is entered and exited. With these data we can study the 
order in which boxes were opened, and how long each box was open. 
Measuring patterns of information search provides an indirect way of 
learning about cognitive processes that are not directly observable. Think 
of the brain as a factory that produces decisions from raw materials (infor-
mation). If we cannot observe the production process in the factory, the 
next best thing is to observe the flow of raw materials into it (information 
into the brain); the order in which materials arrive, how long they are used 
in the production process, and so forth. A theory about how materials are 
assembled (or how information is combined to reach a decision) can be 
tested indirectly by observing the flow of materials. 
Results 
We conducted three sessions comparable to those reported in Johnson et 
al. 1991 with 10 subjects and 8 three-round games (or "trials"), for a total 
of 120 observations. 
We will first discuss and compare the offers players made in the gain-
and-loss games, and how often offers were rejected. We then will tum to 
the information search data revealed by MOUSELAB. 
Offers, Rejections, and Counteroffers 
Three important stylized facts4 have emerged from alternating-offer bar-
gaining experiments (e.g., Ochs and Roth 1989): 
(1) Subjects do not choose equilibrium divisions. The average offer lies 
somewhere between equal split and eqUilibrium. 
(2) In equilibrium no offers should be rejected, but some are. (About half of 
the equilibrium offers are rejected in gains, and most of them are re-
jected in losses.) 
(3) Most counteroffers (about 80% in gains and 52% in losses) are "disad-
vantageous": they give less to the person making the offer than he or 
she previously rejected. 
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Our first concern is whether these stylized facts are replicated in our 
experiments. Figures 1.2a and 1.2b, for gains and losses respectively, show 
histograms of offers made in the first round (pooling across sessions and 
trials) and plots of rejected first round offers versus resulting second-round 
counteroffers. (To make the gain data comparable to the loss data, all 
offered losses were transformed into $5 minus the offer). 
In the gain domain the average offer is $2.11. The equal-split point 
($2.50) and equilibrium prediction ($1.25) are marked on the figures. Most 
offers are closer to the equal split than to the eqUilibrium, but only a few 
are within a dime of the equal split. The shaded portion of each bar indi· 
cates the number of rejected offers. Offers were rejected 10.8 percent of 
the time in gains, a rate comparable to the rejection rates found in prior 
experiments. Note that equilibrium offers (between $1.20 and $1.40) are 
rare, and are rejected about half the time. 
In the loss domain the average offer was $2.22 (i.e., player 1 offered 
player 2 a loss of - $2.78, leaving her with a net gain of $2.22). Offers 
were rejected 22.5 percent of the time, and low offers were very frequently 
rejected. For example, gain offers of less than $1.80 were accepted about 
half the time (see figure 1.2a), but loss offers giving player 2 a net payment 
less than $1.80 were rejected all but once (see figure 1.2b). Offers were also 
much more dispersed in the expanding-loss game than in the shrinking-
gain game. In the loss domain there are several offers above the equal split 
(indicating player l's offer to accept more than half the initial loss) and 
below the perfect equilibrium. 
First-round rejections result in a second round of play. The right panel 
of figure 1.2a shows first-round offers rejected by player 2 (vertical axis) 
plotted against counteroffers player 2 proposed for herself in the second 
round (horizontal axis). A point above the diagonal line indicates a case 
where player 2 rejected an offer (e.g., $1.80) then proposed a division of the 
second-round pie which gave her even less ($1.25). Figure 1.2a shows that 
85 percent of second-round offers are disadvantageous, falling above the 
diagonal line. This striking frequency of disadvantageous counteroffers is 
close to the fraction observed in earlier studies. However, in the loss do-
main only 52 percent of the counteroffers are disadvantageous. 
Dark circles in figures 1.2a and 1.2b indicate second-round offers which 
were rejected. In the gain domain 23 percent (3/14) of second-round offers 
are rejected; in the loss domain, 37 percent (10/27) are rejected. (Two of 
the three subsequent third-round offers were rejected in the gain domain, 
and eight of ten in the loss domain.) 
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These results roughly replicate the stylized facts discovered in earlier 
experiments: Mean offers lie between equal split and perfect equilibrium; a 
- substantial minority of offers (10-20%) are rejected; and most counter-
offers are disadvantageous. However, in the expanding-loss games offers 
are more dispersed, more offers are rejected, and fewer counteroffers are 
disadvantageous. 
Information Search: Theory 
We examine three measures of information search: (I) number of acquisitions 
per box (number of times each box is opened in a period); (2) total time 
examining payoff, or looking time, per box (amount of clock time each box 
is open in a periodS); and (3) number of transitions from one specific box to 
another. 
Before presenting data, it is useful to ask: If subjects were using back-
ward induction to compute perfect equilibrium offers, what would their 
pattern of information search look like? 
One possible answer is that eqUilibrium analysis predicts only outcomes 
(equilibrium offers); it says nothing about the process by which putcomes 
are derived. We think this answer is unproductive and wrong6 If we test 
only the theory's outcome predictions, it is clearly rejected. We tum to 
process predictions as a way to see where the theory fails. If we are not 
allowed to specify the theory as a process and test it with information 
search data, we are left with a rejected theory and no obvious way of 
figuring out why it failed. 
Players using backward induction to calculate equilibrium offers might 
search for information as follows: 
(I) First look at the third-round payoff, and figure out the equilibrium offer 
in that round. (This calculation is simplest.) 
(2) Then look at the second-round payoff, and figure out the equilibrium 
offer in that round. This calculation will take more time, and may 
require subjects to glance back and forth between the second- to the 
third-round boxes. 
(3) Finally, look at the first-round payoff. 7 
Thus, we take equilibrium analysis to predict: transitions from box to 
box will be predominantly backward transitions, from the nth-round box to 
the (II - Ilth-round box; the longest looking time will be in the second 
box; looking times in the first- and third-round boxes will be shorter. 
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The reader may object to our characterization of the information search 
process that is inherent in equilibrium analysis. Weare eager to hear alter-
native characterizations. We also derived an empirical characterization of 
equilibrium information search by training a group of subjects in backward 
induction (see Johnson et a1. 1991) and rewarding them for computing the 
perfect equilibrium offer. Those subjects looked mostly at the second and 
third boxes, and moved backward (from future round boxes to current 
ones) more often than forward. 
There is no obvious prediction from game theory about how bargaining 
over losses and gains will differ, either in offers or in search for informa-
tion. However, the principle of loss-aversion (losses are more painful than 
eqUivalent-sized gains are pleasurable) suggests that people might sacrifice 
more time and effort-they will work harder-to avoid losses in bargain-
ing than to reap gains. For example, Maule (1989) found that people who 
were asked to speak aloud while making a choice spoke more when making 
choices involving losses rather than gains. Similarly, we suspect our sub-
jects might spend more time processing information revealed by boxes, 
opening boxes, and making transitions between boxes, when bargaining 
over losses instead of gains. 
Information Search before Player l's First-Round Offer 
We start our analysis of information search patterns by studying informa-
tion search by player I subjects in the first round of each game (pooled 
across all eight trials of all three experimental sessions). Table 1.1 presents 
these data for the loss domain (for the gain domain data see Johnson et aI. 
1991). 
In both domains most of the looking time (12.91 seconds out of 20.82 
total seconds in gains, and 24. 17 seconds out of 32.97 total seconds in 
losses) is spent looking at the first-round pie size. Half as much time in gain, 
and less than a fourth in loss, is spent looking at the second round. Only I 
Table 1.1 
Information search measures, player l's first-round offer (all trials), expanding-loss game 
Round Number of Total Time 
Transitions 
(loss) Acquisitions Examining Payoff 2 3 
Round 1 ($5.00) 4.10 24.17 1.75 0.64 
Round 2 ($7.50) 2.85 5.40 1.20 1.20 
Round 3 ($8.25) 2.25 3.42 0.64 0.68 
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second in gains and 3 seconds in losses are spent looking at the third-round 
pie size. In fact, in 10 percent of the trial in gain and 14 percent in loss the 
players did not even open the third-round box (although they opened the 
first-round box in every trial). Without opening each box, players cannot 
possibly be calculating equilibrium offers by using backward induction. 
Notice that each box is opened about 2-4 times each trial in both 
domains. These data suggest subjects are opening and reopening boxes 
frequently, rather than memorizing the numbers in the boxes. The pattern 
of transitions between boxes is shown in the last three columns of table 1.1. 
Entries show the average number of transitions from the row box to the 
column box. (For example, players moved from the round 3 box to the 
round 2 box an average of .68 times per trial.) Contrary to the backward 
induction prediction, there are always more forward transitions (above the 
diagonal) than backward ones (below the diagonal). 
The pattern of search evident in table 1.1 does not conform to our 
characterization of equilibrium search. Most looking time is concentrated 
on the first-round pie, with decreasing attention paid to second- and third-
round pies, and subjects make forward transitions rather than backward 
ones. Figure 1.3 is an icon graph which displays the information processing 
measures given in table 1.1 (marked LOSS), and corresponding measures for 
the shrinking-gain game results (marked GAIN) reported in Johnson et al. 
1991. Each box corresponds to the approximate position of the three pay-
off boxes on the MOUSELAB computer display. The width of each box is 
proportional to the number of acquisitions of that box (the second column 
in table 1.1). The height of the shaded area in each box is proportional to 
the amount of time spent looking at that box (the third column in table 1.1). 
The shaded areas are standardized so that the box which is open longest 
(in this case, the first-round payoff in the loss domain) is completely filled. 
(Horizontal lines show the midpoints of each box to make comparisons 
easy.) 
The arrows represent the number of transitions between boxes (the three 
right-hand columns in table 1.1). The thickness of each arrow is propor-
tional to its frequency. To simplify the display, we left out arrows marking 
transitions that occurred less than once a trial, on average. 
The icon graphs express visually what table 1.1 shows numerically: in 
both domains, subjects open the first and second boxes most often, and 
look at the first box longest. They barely glance at the third box (although 
in loss they open it more often, for more time, than in gain). They move 
back and forth between the first and second boxes relatively often, and 
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Figure 1.3 
leon graphs of player 1 first-round information search measures 
more in gain than in loss. In terms of total looking time and number of box 
openings, subjects do appear to work harder when bargaining over losses 
than when bargaining over gains. 
The Relation between Information Search and First-Round Offers 
Table 1.1 and figure 1.3 show that in both domains, subjects appear to 
search for information in ways that are inconsistent with backward induc-
tion. It is also useful to look for differences in information processing, to see 
if they are correlated with differences in offers. 
Based on first-round offers to player 2s, we divided trials into three 
groups-"near-perfect" « $2.01, n = 23), middle (between $2.01 and 
$2.39, n = 36), and equal-split ($2.40 or above, n = 61). Figure 1.4 shows 
an icon graph of information processing measures for trials which fall into 
each of the three groups. Information processing is similar in each of the 
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Figure 1.4 
Player 1 information search measures classified by first-round offer 
three groups. By contrast, in bargaining over gains, subjects who looked 
further ahead in the game also tended to make lower "near-perfect" offers 
(see Johnson et al. 1991). 
Information Research by Player 2 
So far we have concentrated on first-round offers made by player 1. What 
about information search by player 2s as they consider the offers? (Note 
that player 2s were not allowed to open boxes until they got a specific 
offer from player 1.) Figure 1.5 shows icon graphs of information search by 
player 2s, classified by whether offers were rejected and by the size of 
offers that were accepted. Generally, search patterns by player 2s look 
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Figure 1.5 
Player 2 first-round information search measures classified by rejection or acceptance and 
first-round offer 
much like the patterns for player 1: search is concentrated on the first-round 
payoff, the third-round box is rarely opened, and transitions tend to be 
forward (from earlier- to later-round boxes) rather than backward. The 
most striking difference is between the first column (representing pro-
cessing by players who reject offers, which tend to be below $2.00) and the 
second column (players who accept roughly the same offers, below $2.00). 
Compared to players who reject low offers, players who accept low offers 
look about twice as long at the second pie size, and make more transitions 
between the first and second boxes (shown by thicker arrows in the second 
column). Subjects who accept low offers appear to think through the conse-
quences of rejecting an offer better than rejecting subjects do. A similar 
difference is evident in bargaining over gains (Johnson et al. 1991). 
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Learning and Experience 
In our experiments each subject participated in eight trials, four as player 1 
and four as player 2. Learning might be manifested by changes in informa-
tion processing over the trials. For example, if subjects learn backward 
induction by sheer repetition of bargaining, then there should be a shift in 
information processing from round one to future rounds, across trials in an 
experiment. Figure 1.6 shows icon graphs of information processing mea-
sures over the four trials in which a subject was player 1. There appears to 
be no substantial effect of repetition on information processing. 
Simply repeating the same game does not seem to teach subjects back-
ward induction. But learning might occur when subjects have an offer 
11 II 1 11 \ 
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Figure 1.6 
Player 1 first-round information search measures across four trials 
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rejected, and bargaining proceeds to the second round. Then subjects di-
rectly experience the consequences of a first-round rejection, which might 
affect the way they think about their subsequent first-round offer. (Harrison 
and McCabe's (1992) design mimics this kind of learning by forcing sub-
jects to play subgames between each trial of three-round bargaining.) 
To test the effect of a first-round rejection on subsequent play, we 
compare measures of information processing by a player 1 subject at four 
points in time: (1) the trial in which a first-round offer was rejected (,,1st 
reject"); (2) the second round of that same trial ("next round"); (3) the "next 
trial"; and (4) the next trial in which the subject had the role of player 1 
again ("next as I"). Figure 1.7 shows an icon graph comparing information 
processing measures at these four points. The only striking difference is 
11 
Figure 1.7 
Player I information search measures classified by four kinds of experience 
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that in the second round after a first-round rejection (marked "next round"), 
subjects look much more frequently at the second-round pie size, as one 
would expect. Experiencing a rejection in the first-round of one trial does 
not cause players to look further ahead in the first-round of the next trial. 
Implications and Conclusions 
We studied offers and patterns of information search in three-round 
alternating-offer bargaining over expanding losses, and compared the results 
to a shrinking-gain game studied by Johnson et ai. (1991). As in most other 
experiments on bargaining with discounting, offers were scattered between 
an equal split of the first-round pie and the perfect equilibrium offer (de-
rived from backward induction). About 10 percent of the offers were re-
jected in gains and 23 percent were rejected in losses. 
Patterns of information search showed that most subjects did not look at 
the pie sizes in the correct order, and for the length of time, necessary for 
backward induction. Instead, subjects concentrated on the current round 
when making decisions. In the first round they looked mostly at the first-
round pie size and looked only briefly at the third-round pie. Subjects who 
looked ahead were no more likely to make offers closer to the equilibrium 
prediction, but they were more likely to accept low offers. Repeating the 
game, or having a first-round offer rejected, had no discernible impact on 
information processing. 
Since subjects do not appear to be using backward induction to compute 
offers, it would be helpful to know what they are thinking. We think that 
subjects try to approximate the profit-maximizing offer, and their attention 
is guided by (at least) two heuristics: the size heuristic directs attention to 
the largest-sized pies; and the distance heuristic directs attention to current-
round pies, leading people to ignore distant rounds that are unlikely to 
occur. A theory that weaves these heuristics into a cognitive account of 
how subjects choose offers in sequential bargaining would be an extremely 
useful alternative to the perfect equilibrium theory. 
While the gain-and-Ioss conditions were designed to be identical in 
terms of subjects' final wealth, there were several notable differences in 
behavior. In the loss condition subjects opened the boxes more frequently, 
and looked at the pie sizes about twice as long. Although the average offer 
was similar for gains and losses, offers were more widely dispersed in the 
loss condition and were rejected twice as often (see Bazerman 1983). 
Recall that two features have been proposed to explain anomalies in 
sequential bargaining: fairness and learning. Some fairness-based models 
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suggest that people play sophisticatedly but care about their opponent's pay. 
off (e.g., Bolton 1991 in a two-round game). Our information-processing 
evidence suggests that any model that assumes players backward induct is 
a poor descriptive account of how people think. Such a model might make 
reasonable predictions, but models that incorporate better representations 
of human cognition could make even better predictions. 
Our data support the initial premise of the leaming-based approaches-
that players do not begin by reasoning game-theoretically-but we found 
little evidence that any learning actually occurred. Either learning requires 
more sheer experience than the eight trials our subjects engaged in, or the 
experience must be of a different sort. The effect of different amounts and 
kinds of experience on learning is an important empirical question that our 
system is well-equipped to answer. 
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1. The perfect equilibrium is calculated as follows (assuming players reject offers 
they are indifferent toward and the smallest unit of currency is $.01). In the third 
round, an ultimatum game, player 1 offers $.01 and keeps $1.24. Anticipating that, 
player 2 offers $1.25 in round 2 and keeps $1.25. So player 1 offers $1.26 in round 
1 and keeps $3.74. If players accept offers they are indifferent toward, there are a 
small band of perfect equilibria from $1.24-$1.27. We refer to "the" equilibrium at 
$1.25 for simplicity. 
2. Our focus on deviations as a source of understanding about typical reasoning is 
not unusual in science. Researchers often study unusual departures from everyday 
patterns-the Great Depression, supernovae, volcanic eruptions-in order to 
learn more about those patterns. 
3. In these experiments subjects alternated roles across rounds, but the software 
was deSigned to be flexible enough to study nonalternating-offer bargaining, too. 
4. Of course, there are many qualifications to the stylized facts. The most impor-
tant is that learning may create convergence to equilibrium, reducing the number 
of rejections and disadvantageous counteroffers (as in Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton 
1985; and Harrison and McCabe 1992). But the empirical evidence of learning is 
mixed. 
5. To distinguish players actually examining information from those who opened 
boxes aCCidentally (usually while moving from one box to another), we filtered out 
all information acquisitions lasting less than .18 seconds. Psychologists have found 
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that people do not accurately perceive anything they see that briefly (Card, Moran, 
and Newell 1983). 
6. Data presented in Johnson et al. 1991 show that differences in processing were 
correlated with outcomes in bargaining over gains. Therefore, the idea that offers 
are independent of information search patterns, so that equilibrium offers could 
result from any search pattern, is wrong empirically. 
7. Of course, to calculate an equilibrium offer to player 2, player I does not 
actually need to look at the first-round payoff at all, as long as she knows the first 
round pie is bigger (smaller for losses) than the second-round pie. 
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